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A QUICK POINT REGARDING
PERPETUAL TRADE SECRET
ROYALTY LIABILITY*
Louis ALTmAN**
1.

INTRODUCTION

In Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals' had held that if a trade secret license requires
the licensee to pay royalties for as long as he produces the licensed product, then under certain circumstances judicial enforcement of that particular aspect of the license must be denied
on federal pre-emption grounds. On certiorari, this decision was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court.2 One might
think that Court had already banished the specter of federal
pre-emption from the trade secret field in Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp.;3 but the issue of royalty liability was not involved
Copyright © 1979 Louis Altman. All Rights Reserved.
J.D., Harvard University, 1958; A.B., Cornell University, 1955. Mr.
Altman is affiliated with the law firm of Hosier, Niro &Daleiden, Ltd. in Chicago, Illinois. A former Associate Professor at The John Marshall Law
School, Mr. Altman is now an adjunct faculty member.
This article was originally presented to the 23rd Annual John Marshall
Law School Intellectual Property Conference a few days before the
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Supreme Court decided Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson. It appears here

in revised form as a retrospective commentary on that decision. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Ms. Shaun McParland,
the Executive Comments Editor of The John Marshall Law Review.

1. 567 F.2d 757, 196 U.S.P.Q. 281 (8th Cir. 1977). Quick Point involved
the validity of a potentially perpetual trade secret licensing agreement. Aronson, the designer of a keyholder, granted Quick Point Pencil Company an
exclusive license to manufacture and sell the keyholder in exchange for
royalty payments of five percent of the selling price, to be reduced to two
and one-half percent if no patent was granted on the keyholder design
within five years. The license agreement was to continue for as long as
Quick Point manufactured the keyholder. After the patent application was
rejected and other competitors began to use the design, QuickPoint sought
a judgment declaring the royalty agreement unenforceable.
2. 99 S. Ct. 1096, 201 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1979).
3. 416 U.S. 470, 181 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1974). In Kewanee, the plaintiff sought
injunctive relief and damages for trade secret misappropriation. The district court, applying Ohio trade secret law, granted a permanent injunction.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Ohio's trade secret law conflicted with the underlying policy of the federal patent laws. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether state
trade secret protection is pre-empted by operation of the federal patent law.
The Court held that state trade secret protection against disclosure of subject matter which is unpatentable, doubtfully patentable, or even clearly
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in Kewanee. It is possible, however, to argue that a victory for
the licensee in Quick Point would at least have been strongly
inconsistent with the rationale of Kewanee.
Trade secret protection of the kind at issue in Quick Point
normally arises under state law.4 Even when trade secret litigation between private parties takes place in a federal forum, the
basis of jurisdiction is normally diversity of citizenship 5 or pendent jurisdiction, 6 and under the rationale of Erie RailroadCo. v.
Tompkins, 7 state law governs. The particular state legal doctrine invoked to justify trade secret protection may sound in tort
(particularly in those cases where the secret has been purloined
by improper means), 8 or it may be cast in terms of breach of a
confidential relationship, 9 or of a contractual relationship. 10 One
particularly noteworthy example of a contractual relationship is
trade secret licensing, which is the foundation of an important

industry."

Such licenses may employ various provisions as to

the duration of royalty liability: they may provide that royalties
will be payable only for a prescribed term, or for however long
the licensed subject matter in fact remains secret; or they may
require royalty liability to continue as long as the licensee uses
the licensed subject matter, even if secrecy should terminate
patentable, does not conflict with the patent law policy of encouraging invention; nor is it inconsistent with the patent policy that matter once in the
public domain must remain there. The Court accordingly reversed the
Court of Appeals decision.
4. E.g., Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116
Cal. Rptr. 654, 184 U.S.P.Q. 682 (1974); Choisser Research Corp. v. Electronic
Vision Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. 234 (Cal. 1972); Laff v. John 0. Butler Co., 64 Ill.
App. 3d 603, 381 N.E.2d 423, 200 U.S.P.Q. 373 (1978).
5. E.g., Richter v. Westab, Inc., 529 F.2d 896, 189 U.S.P.Q. 321 (6th Cir.
1976); Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 171 U.S.P.Q. 731
(7th Cir. 1971).
6. E.g., Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d
894, 184 U.S.P.Q. 521 (10th Cir. 1975) (state law counterclaim to a federal
antitrust action).
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. E.g., University Computing Co. v. Lykes, 504 F.2d 518, 183 U.S.P.Q.
705 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 505 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1974); Forest Laboratories,
Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 171 U.S.P.Q. 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
9. E.g., Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 197
U.S.P.Q. 273 (5th Cir. 1978); Crocan Corp. v. Sheller-Globe Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 251, 185 U.S.P.Q. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
10. E.g., Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems:, Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 162
U.S.P.Q. 321 (5th Cir. 1969); Structual Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Armour & Co. v. United Am. Food Processors, Inc., 37 Il1. App. 3d 132, 345
N.E.2d 795 (1976).
11. E.g., Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 169 U.S.P.Q. 528 (2d
Cir. 1971); see, e.g., cases cited in note 4 supra. See generally Annot., Employees' Duty Not to Disclose Skills or Techniques Acquired in EarlierEmployment, 30 A.L.R.3d 631 (1970).
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first. The latter situation, in which royalty liability is potentially
perpetual, was the subject of litigation in the so-called Listerine
case ( Warner-Lambert PharmaceuticalCo., Inc. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc.12 ). In that case, nothing at all was said about royalty
termination in the license agreement. 13 In Quick Point, on the
other hand, the parties expressly agreed that, in the absence of
patent protection, royalty liability would continue for as long as
the licensee used the licensed subject matter. 14 The question I
would like to examine in this paper is whether there is any federal impediment when such perpetual trade secret royalty liability arises under state contract law.
2.

THE KEWANEE DECISION

In Kewanee, the United States Supreme Court seriously entertained the proposition that federal patent policy pre-empts
all trade secret protection. The Court began its analysis of this
proposition by accepting the premise that "if the scheme of protection developed by [state law] respecting trade secrets
'clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws, 15 ...
then the state law must fall.' 6 It is only because the Court
found no such clash of objectives in the Kewanee fact situation
that it held there was no pre-emption. But the Court clearly did
recognize the potential for pre-emption if the proper basis (a
clash of objectives between federal patent policy and some asprotection) could be found in the facts
pect of state trade secret
17
of some other case.
In Quick Point, the Court seemed to imply that the
Kewanee case controlled the Quick Point fact situation, when it
said that "Kewanee ... puts to rest the contention that federal
law pre-empts and renders unenforceable the contract made by
12. 178 F. Supp. 655, 123 U.S.P.Q. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a'd per curiam,
280 F.2d 197, 126 U.S.P.Q. 3 (2d Cir. 1960).
13. The Listerine court determined that it was implicit in the agreement
that termination of the licensee's obligation to pay royalties would occur

only when the licensee ceased to manufacture and sell Listerine. Id. at 662,
123 U.S.P.Q. at 436. The court held that disclosure of the trade secret did not

relieve the licensee of his obligation to pay royalties. Id. at 665-66, 123

U.S.P.Q. at 439.
14. "[I] f Mrs. Aronson's patent application was 'not allowed within five
(5) years, Quick Point Pencil Co. [would] pay two and one half percent (21/2%) of sales ...so long as you [Quick Point] continue to sell same.'" 99
S. Ct. at 1098, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 3 (1979).
15. Quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231, 140
U.S.P.Q. 524, 528 (1964).
16. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 480, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 678
(1974).

17. Id. Kewanee is summarized in note 3 supra.
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these parties."'1 8 But clearly Kewanee did not decide anything
at all about the duration issue of Quick Point. The question of
perpetual liability was not on appeal in Kewanee, because, as
the majority opinion there expressly stated, the injunction
which had been granted by the Kewanee trial court endured
only "until such time as the trade secrets had been released to
the public, had otherwise generally become available to the public, or had been obtained by [defendants] from sources having
the legal right to convey the information."' 19 The dissenting
opinion of Justice Douglas in Kewanee therefore appears mistaken in complaining that: "By the District Court's injunction,
which the Court approves and reinstates, [plaintiff] gets a permanent injunction running into perpetuity against [defendants] ."20
3.

PRE-EMPTION OF DURATION ONLY

But what if an injunction does bar a defendant indefinitely
from using the trade secrets of the plaintiff? Since this issue
had been left open by Kewanee, it remained possible, as the
Supreme Court prepared to announce its Quick Point decision,
that the doctrine of pre-emption would yet be applied to produce
a federal "rule against perpetuities" with regard to trade secret
liability. And now that the Supreme Court has decided Quick
Point in favor of the trade secret proprietor, it appears, surprisingly, that the issue is still partially unresolved.
There is at present a split of authority in the trade secret
field between various jurisdictions adopting the so-called
Shellmar and Conmar rules. The Shelmar rule, named after
Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley,21 is to the effect that, if
a defendant without authorization uses subject matter which is
a trade secret of the plaintiff at the time the defendant obtains
the information, the defendant may be permanently enjoined
from using that subject matter even though it later becomes
18. 99 S. Ct. at 1101, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
19. 416 U.S. at 473, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 675.
20. Id. at 496, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 683.
21. 87 F.2d 104, 32 U.S.P.Q. 24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1936).
In Shellmar, the misappropriated trade secret was subsequently disclosed
in a patent and thus revealed to the public. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a permanent injunction restraining defendant from using
the subject matter of the trade secret notwithstanding the subsequent disclosure to the public. The court reasoned that defendant, by its inequitable
conduct, was precluded from enjoying the rights of the general public. Id.
at 110, 32 U.S.P.Q. at 29.
At present, the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits follow this rule. For
general discussion and cases following the Shellmar rule, see Johnson,
Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 1004, 1026-30 (1978).
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generally known, and would therefore no longer be eligible for
trade secret protection as against the defendant's competitors.
The Shellmar rule probably enhances the deterrent effect of
trade secret law. But the disadvantage of the rule is that it puts
the defendant at a competitive disadvantage as against others in
his industry who are free to use the subject matter once it becomes generally known. This undoubtedly impinges to some extent upon the federal policy, which has been held to underlie the
patent laws, 22 that unpatented subject matter shall generally be
freely available to all competitors. Once trade secrets have been
in public or commercial use for more than a year, they are no
longer eligible for patent protection; 23 and hence, they come
within that policy of free availability. Should Shellmar type perpetual trade secret protection therefore be federally preempted?
There is also a line of authority applying the contrary Conmar rule, named after Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide
FastenerCo., Inc.,24 which is to the effect that an injunction protecting a trade secret should not endure after the subject matter
is generally disclosed (presumably by someone other than the
defendant himself). Thus, the defendant would be restrained
only so long as the subject matter remains eligible for protection
as against the defendant's competitors. The advantage of this
approach is that it does not introduce inequalities between competitors. There are also cases extending the duration of injunctive relief somewhat beyond the point of general disclosure of
the secret, but only for a period approximating the time which
the court thinks it would have taken the defendant to generate
the technology in question by proper means, such as independent research or reverse-engineering of a publicly available product.25 The advantage of all these Conmar type approaches is
that they do not keep the defendant out of the marketplace any
22. See Sears, Roebuck &Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229, 140 U.S.P.Q.
524, 527 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237,
140 U.S.P.Q. 528, 530 (1964).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
24. 172 F.2d 150, 80 U.S.P.Q. 108 (2d Cir. 1949). In Conmar, the owner of
the trade secret and the misappropriator thereof were characterized as parties to a fiduciary relationship. However, once the secret became publicly
known, the court considered the fiduciary relationship ended, and held that
no harm inured to the owner of the former secret by permitting the wrongdoer to use it. For general discussion and cases following the Conmarrule,
see Johnson, Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 1004,
1026-30 (1978).
25. E.g., Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969, 153 U.S.P.Q. 323 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 829, 155 U.S.P.Q. 767 (1967); Winston Research
Corp. v. Minnesota Mining &Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 146 U.S.P.Q. 422 (9th Cir.
1965).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:127

longer than he would have been out if he had acquired the technology properly. They are subject to the criticism that they have
a somewhat weaker deterrent effect than perpetual relief. But
they do appear more congruent with the competitive mandate of
federal patent policy.
There is an indication in at least one case which took a Conmar approach, that this was done because of a federal imperative.26 On the other hand, at least one other court which has
limited the duration of a trade secret injunction seems to have
done so merely on the basis of its perception of the applicable
state law. 27 Thus, limitations on the duration of trade secret re-

lief can be imposed purely as a matter of the balancing of competing state policies. But it is also possible that this issue could
be foreclosed to the states by an overriding federal concern for
preserving the equality of competitive access to technology
which is in the public domain. Under state law, the unsuccessful defendant in a trade secret case may have a weaker claim to
such solicitude than others do, since his commercial ethics have
been judicially found wanting. But, as noted above, the
Kewanee Court has already indicated that such considerations
might have to yield if they conflict with federal patent policy.
Thus, if the District Court in Kewanee had granted a perpetual (Shellmar) injunction instead of a limited duration (Conmar) injunction, it is possible the Supreme Court might have
found some basis for federal pre-emption. This is not necessarily to say that the Court would have denied injunctive relief entirely and limited the plaintiff's remedy to damages, as Justice
Douglas' dissent seems to suggest.28 But they might well have
modified the injunction by putting the typical Conmar time limitations on it (as the District Court in fact did, without any urging
from above); and they might have done so, not as a matter of a
federal diversity court's perception of state law, but as a matter
of overriding federal policy imposed on the states. In any event,
it is clear from Justice Douglas' emphatic reference in his dissenting opinion to Sears and Compco, 29 that such overriding
26. Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969, 153 U.S.P.Q. 323 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, 389 U.S. 869 (1967). The court stated that "[t]he reasoning of

Sears and Day-Brite and the holdings therein compels [sic] the holding
here that Hampton cannot be permanently enjoined." Id. at 973, 153
U.S.P.Q. at 326.
27. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d
134, 143, 146 U.S.P.Q. 422, 428 (9th Cir. 1965) (applying California law).
28. "Damages for breach of a contract are one thing; an injunction barring disclosure does service for the protection accorded valid patents and is
therefore pre-empted." 416 U.S. at 499, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 684. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 495, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 683.
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federal policy was the basis for his criticism of the injunctive
relief granted in Kewanee. Thus, although Kewanee said that
federal patent policy will not be allowed to pre-empt trade secret protection entirely, the possibility remained after Kewanee
that there may yet be partial federal pre-emption in this field,
limited to the question of duration. Nor is this partial pre-emption approach inconsistent with the decision in Quick Point.
Quick Point involved the licensing of trade secrets, as opposed
to the tortious misappropriation of trade secrets. Thus, there is
nothing in either the Supreme Court's Kewanee or Quick Point
decisions which rules out a federally compelled Conmar time
limitation on the injunctive relief granted in cases where the relationship between the parties is one of tort (misappropriation
of trade secrets) rather than contract (licensing of trade
secrets).
4.

MISAPPROPRIATION VS. LICENSING

It can be argued that one who has voluntarily contracted to
subject himself to perpetual royalty liability has a weaker claim
to be relieved of that liability by federal pre-emption than one
who has not so contracted; and therefore, the duration of liability should not be limited in the case of one who violates a contractual obligation even if we accept the premise that it should
be limited in the case of one who obtains trade secrets by tortious means. That argument is the main thesis of this paper.
The argument is subject to at least one significant objection:
does it really make sense to treat tortious misappropriators better than we treat contract breakers? The answer to that question, it seems to me, is that when a contractor violates his
contract, such discrimination may make a great deal of sense.
The federal policy favoring free availability of unpatented technology is concerned more with the competitive process than it is
with the ethics of any particular competitor. The trade secret
misappropriator may deserve a privileged position under federal law, because he is a vigorous competitor. Of course, he has
become too vigorous, because he has stepped across the line
which marks out the area of unacceptable behavior. For having
done that, he will at least be prevented from realizing any benefit from his transgression; i.e., even under the Conmar rule he
Today's decision is at war with the philosophy of Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225, and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
Iwhere] [w] e held that when an article is unprotected by a
U.S. 234 ...

patent, state law may not forbid others to copy it, because every article
not covered by a valid patent is in the public domain.
Id.
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will be enjoined from using the misappropriated trade secret
during the period of secrecy, when he would not have known the
secret but for his transgression. Once that period of time is
over, however, it is arguable that federal policy is best served by
returning him as soon as possible to the competitive arena without any further disability. Any contrary state policy which favors a Shellmar style injunction of longer duration might have to
yield to that federal policy.
On this analysis, the purpose of an injunction against a
trade secret violator is primarily to restore the status quo which
existed prior to the violation, first by depriving the defendant of
any benefit from his transgression during the period of time
when he would not otherwise have had the secret, and later by
restoring the original competitive relation after that time period
expires. A significant degree of deterrent effect would arise
from such a limited duration policy, and such deterrence would
be an important secondary objective of the injunction. But any
further deterrent effect, purchased at the cost of a long-term
skewing of the relationship between the defendant and his competitors, may exact too high a price when measured against the
federal policy of free competition. Indeed, that may be precisely
the policy balance which has been struck by those courts which
follow the Conmar rule, even though some of them have looked
to state law rather than federal law as the source of the free
30
competition policy thus served.
The contrary notion, that accepting a trade secret license is
more socially useful behavior than trade secret misappropriation, is not necessarily true if the licensee defaults on his promise to pay royalties. In one sense the licensee who violates his
promise to pay royalties is a more insidious character than one
who improperly obtains trade secrets. The misappropriator is a
thief who obtains the secret against the will of the owner. But
the deadbeat licensee is an invitee who induces the trade secret
owner to part with his secret voluntarily. He is welcomed into
the licensor's plant and helped to obtain full disclosure and
technical assistance. He therefore gets more information, and
gets it. more easily, than the tortious misappropriator does.
There is no defense against this kind of behavior at the time it
occurs, because it is not perceived as an invasion. We can bar
our windows against a burglar, but we are relatively helpless
against a dinner guest who steals the silverware. The only rem30. See, e.g., Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Lemay Valve Co., 354 S.W.2d 913 (Mo.
App. 1962) (applying Missouri law); Van Prods. Co. v. General Welding &
Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769, 147 U.S.P.Q. 221 (1965) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
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edy the trade secret owner has, as to any secrets which have
been widely disclosed, is the hope of future judicial enforcement
of the licensee's promise to pay for what he has received, so long
as he continues to use it.
But should such payment continue indefinitely? The licensee has voluntarily agreed that it should. Most lawyers who
practice in this field would probably counsel the licensee not to
accept a contractual obligation of perpetual royalty. The licensee thus has the perfect protection against such a bad bargain:
refusal. But if he wants the technology badly enough to promise
perpetual royalties, and if the licensor has refused to part with it
on any other terms, then the licensee has voluntarily committed
himself. And in disclosing the trade secrets, the licensor has irretrievably changed his position in reliance on that commitment. Voluntary contractual commitments generally have a
strong claim to judicial enforcement; the entire weight of the
common law of contracts is to that effect.
There is another reason why a trade secret misappropriator
presents a more compelling claim to the benefits of federal preemption than does a trade secret licensee who has failed to pay
royalties. The deadbeat licensee has at least received part of
what the federal policy wants him to have: i.e., possession of the
licensor's technology, albeit subject to a royalty obligation. As
the Supreme Court's Quick Point opinion observed, in distinguishing the Sears and Compco cases: "Enforcement of Quick
Point's agreement ... does not prevent anyone from copying
the keyholder. It merely requires Quick Point to pay the consid,,31 Thus, even if the federal preeration which it promised .
emption doctrine is not applied for the benefit of the licensee, he
still has at least a chance of remaining a competitive factor in
the marketplace, provided he can afford the royalties. The licensee who is sued for royalties on the license agreement is subject
only to monetary relief, not to an injunction. 32 But the trade se31. 99 S. Ct. at 1100, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 5. Quick Point had argued that enforcement of the license agreement conflicts with the federal policy against

withdrawing ideas from the public domain, and further discourages recourse to the patent system "by allowing states to extend 'perpetual protec-

tion to articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent ...under federal

constitutional standards.'" Id. at 1099, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 5, quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232, 140 U.S.P.Q. 524, 528 (1964).
32. But what if the suit is not for royalties? Suppose, instead, that the

licensor elects to treat the licensee's failure to pay royalties as a breach

which justifies the licensor's termination of the license agreement. The li-

censor might then sue for an injunction to prevent any further use of the
licensed technology by the licensee. Under such circumstances the argument that the licensor is not seeking to deprive the licensee of any technol-

ogy could not be interposed to prevent application of the federal preemption doctrine in support of Conmar-type limitations on the duration of
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cret misappropriator is subject to an injunction, which will at
least temporarily take him out of the marketplace entirely, so far
as use of the trade secret is concerned. In the latter case, therefore, federal policy may have a greater interest in limiting the
duration of the relief.
For all these reasons, it may well be concluded that the policy justifications for applying the federal pre-emption doctrine
to limit the duration of the royalty liability of a trade secret licensee are significantly less attractive than are the policy justifications for applying the federal pre-emption doctrine to limit the
duration of an injunction against a trade secret misappropriator.
This conclusion permits one to accept the Conmar principle that
the duration of relief against tortfeasors should be limited, without necessarily rejecting the perpetual royalty liability in Listerine and Quick Point.
5.

INJUNCTIVE VS. MONETARY RELIEF

Before proceeding with further consideration of the Quick
Point problem, it would be a good idea to digress at this point by
asking whether the distinction thus drawn between trade secret
misappropriation cases and trade secret license cases is workable generally. If the basis for the distinction is merely the consensual nature of the license relationship, then the defendants
who should get the benefit of a limit on the duration of their
trade secret liability include all those who engage in illegal or
tortious or otherwise improper behavior to obtain the secret information directly from the plaintiff, as well as all those who
knowingly obtain the secret information, by proper or improper
means, indirectly through some third party 33 who, in turn, obtained it by improper means, such as industrial spying. All such
defendants, while they should be enjoined for a time from enjoying the fruits of their unacceptable conduct, arguably should
not be permanently disabled from competing on equal terms
with the rest of the industry. Then, if all consensual relations
should justify a permanent injunction, the defendants who may
properly be saddled with such relief might include former employees, 34 potential licensees to whom a confidential disclosure
was made for the purpose of interesting them in the plaintiff's
trade secret relief, and the case for leaving state law to strike its own policy
balance, free of federal compulsion, would therefore be somewhat weaker.
For further consideration of this problem, see part 5 of this paper supra.
33. See generally Annot., Propriety of Permanently Enjoining One
Guilty of Unauthorized Use of Trade Secretfrom Engagingin Sale or Manufacture of Device in Question, 38 A.L.R.3d 572 (1971).
34. See generally Annot., Employee's Duty Not to Disclose Skills or Techniques Acquired in EarlierEmployment, 30 A.L.R.3d 631 (1970).
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secret information, on the express or implied understanding
that they would not use or disclose the secret information without the plaintiffs authorization, and trade secret licensees who
violate the secrecy or royalty clauses of their license agreements. But suppose the defendant has violated the conditions
of a confidential disclosure, before the negotiations ever reached
the stage where he committed himself contractually to a particular royalty level. 35 Consider also the employer-employee situation, in which there is frequently an express, 36 and usually an
implied, 37 contractual obligation on the part of the employee to
keep secret all information which he knows to be the employer's
trade secrets, an obligation which survives the term of his employment. 38 These are all the kind of relationships in which the
trade secret proprietor has voluntarily imparted the trade secret
information in the expectation that the recipient will honor an
obligation of secrecy, but in each case the harm has not been
reduced to a liquidated amount of royalty payments by consensus of the parties, as it is in a license agreement. Then, there is
the troublesome case (mentioned in footnote 32 above) in which
the licensor, instead of seeking continued payment of the royalties, terminates the license agreement and asks injunctive relief
against the licensee's further use of the trade secrets. 39 In such
circumstances, although there once was a consensus between
the parties as to the monetary value of the technology, it is arguable that the consensus has now been destroyed by the licensor's termination of the agreement. Does the logic of the
distinction between improper access and consensual access per35. See generally Annot., Implied ObligationNot to Use Trade Secrets or
Similar Confidential Information Disclosed During Unsuccessful Negotiationsfor Sale, License, or the Like, 9 A.L.R.3d 665 (1966).
36. E.g., Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 162

U.S.P.Q. 321 (5th Cir. 1969).
37. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 564 F.2d 286, 197
273 (5th Cir. 1978).

U.S.P.Q.

38. Id.
39. For a similar factual situation, see, e.g., Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,
442 F.2d 216, 169 U.S.P.Q. 528 (1971). The trade secret license agreement in
Painton terminated by its own terms. The licensor, Bourns, chose not to
exercise the right to renew or modify the agreement. Painton, the licensee,

sought a declaration that it was entitled to permanent retention and use of
the drawings and other material which were the subject of the expired
trade secret agreement "free of any claim for infringement, royalty or otherwise. . . ." Id. at 220, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 531. Bourns counterclaimed seeking a
declaration and injunction denying Painton the right to retain or use the
drawings, etc. and to manufacture any models based thereon. Id. at 221, 169
U.S.P.Q. at 531. The court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the licensee, noting that neither general considerations of public policy nor "emanations from the federal patent law
[provide] a sufficient basis for declining to enforce ... trade secret agreements. . . ." Id. at 224, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 534.
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mit a perpetual injunction against use of the secret in such
cases?
Perhaps not. Trade secret relief is much more acceptable
from the viewpoint of federal competition policy when it involves only the payment of money, as Justice Douglas pointed
out in his Kewanee dissent.40 He was speaking there of a onetime judgment for money damages against a tortfeasor, but we
may now ask whether this principle enables us also to discriminate in favor of continuing royalty payments under a trade secret license. At least in some cases, I am prepared to argue that
Justice Douglas' insight should lead us to conclude that perpetual relief is permissible only when that relief is purely monetary. Even in the case of a consensual relationship such as
employment, a license, or a confidential disclosure, it is substantially more difficult, from the standpoint of federal patent policy,
to justify permanent relief where an injunction against use is
concerned, than it is where the payment of money is the only
burden the defendant must suffer indefinitely. Federal policy
has accomplished the most important part of its job when it prevents the defendant from being permanently deprived of technology. Federal policy is significantly less concerned with the
cost of that technology to the defendant. The courts, for example, have traditionally been reluctant to inquire into the amount
of the consideration in a private bargain.4 1 Therefore, one can
logically argue for permanent royalty liability without also approving perpetual injunctive relief against unauthorized use of a
trade secret, even in the case of a defendant who violates an obligation arising out a contractual, confidential, employment or
other consensual relationship.
My only hesitancy in using the line between injunctive and
monetary relief as the boundary between limited and perpetual
duration in all trade secret cases is based on the thought that a
distinction might be drawn between cases, on the one hand, of
the Listerine and Quick Point type, in which the secret has already become generally known to the licensee's competitors
through some means other than a breach of a confidential obligation by the licensee, and a hypothetical case, on the other
hand, in which the secret either is still not generally known to
the licensee's competitors or is known to them only because the
licensee has divulged it in violation of the license agreement. In
the first type of case, a permanent injunction will introduce a
40. See note 28 supra.
41. See, e.g., Dabbs v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 339 F.
Supp. 654 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd, 474 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1973). In Dabbs,the
court stated that it was reluctant to inquire into the adequacy of the consid-

eration in a private bargain.
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competitive imbalance between the licensee who would be
barred from using the technology, and his competitors who are
free to use it. In the hypothetical case where the technology is
still secret, on the other hand, no such competitive imbalance
will occur, provided the injunction is limited to the duration of
secrecy, as it was in Kewanee.4 2 As for the hypothetical case
where the technology would still be secret but for the licensee's
unauthorized disclosure, the same competitive imbalance exists, but the licensee has created it through his own failure to
observe his obligation of confidentiality. It might be less objectionable, from the standpoint of federal patent policy, to give injunctive relief when it does not result in a competitive
imbalance, or even when the competitive imbalance results but
is attributable to the licensee's own breach of confidentiality.
6.

INJUNCTIONS AGAINST DISCLOSURE

So much for justifying different treatment as between injunctive and monetary relief where use of the secret is concerned; what about injunctions directed against disclosure of
the trade secret by the defendant? If there is a significant difference in the level of federal concern about money payments as
opposed to injunctive relief, then there should be no federal objection to a judgment of money damages against a defendant
who has already disclosed the secret generally. But if, despite
the defendant's possession of the secret, he has not yet disclosed it and it is not generally known, should a court be permitted to enjoin the defendant's disclosure permanently, or is that
kind of injunctive relief to be treated just like an injunction
against use, and therefore to be limited in duration in Conmar
fashion? If, as argued above, the federal policy is primarily concerned with the defendant's use of the technology, then perhaps
cost and all other considerations are merely secondary. By this
analysis, disclosure is merely another one of those secondary
considerations, like royalty liability, as to which federal policy
allows the state law greater leeway in extending the duration of
relief.
But that concession turns out not to be necessary. There is
never any point in extending an injunction against disclosure
beyond the time when the trade secret becomes generally
known through proper channels (as it did in both Quick Point
42. The district court in Kewanee, applying Ohio trade secret law,
granted a permanent injunction against the disclosure or use by former em-

ployees of twenty of the forty claimed trade secrets until such time as the
trade secrets had been released to the public, had otherwise generally become available to the public, or had been obtained by former employees
from sources having the legal right to convey the information.
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and Listerine). And even those courts which follow the Conmar
approach permit the injunction to continue at least until general
disclosure through proper means occurs, even where the defendant is a member of the "privileged class" of trade secret
misappropriators. Therefore, there is little room for debate over
the duration of an injunction against disclosure, regardless of
whether one takes a Shellmar or a Conmar approach, and reapproach is perceived as a state
gardless of whether the Conmar
43
imperative.
federal
option or a
The alternative duration of a Conmar style injunction is a
somewhat longer period of time measured by how long the court
thinks it would take the defendant to reverse-engineer, independently re-invent, or otherwise properly acquire the trade secret." But where disclosure is the behavior to be enjoined,
there is no purpose to be served in extending the duration of an
injunction against the defendant's disclosure of the secret beyond the time when it has been already generally disclosed by
someone else. So, under any approach, an injunction against
disclosure could never be justified for any longer period.
7.

TRADE SECRETS VS. PATENTS

Returning now to the Quick Point case and the question of
perpetual royalty liability under federal patent policy, what has
been accomplished in this paper so far is to defend the proposition that Quick Point'sperpetual trade secret royalty liability is
not inconsistent with the Conmar injunction limitation rule,
even if that rule should come with federal underpinnings. But it
is also necessary to ask, as the Supreme Court did in Quick
Point, whether perpetual royalty liability is excluded by the
cases, such as Lear,Inc. v. Adlogic of other federal pre-emption
46
kins45 and Brulotte v. Thys.
For example, is the claim of a trade secret licensor to enforcement of a promise any stronger than the unsuccessful
claim of the patent licensor in Lear?47 It seems that the answer
should be yes, where the promise is to pay royalties as in Quick
43. See notes 26 &27 and accompanying text supra.
44. See cases cited in note 25 supra.
45. 395 U.S. 653, 162 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1969).
46. 379 U.S. 29, 143 U.S.P.Q. 264 (1964), reh. denied, 379 U.S. 985 (1965).

47. In Lear, the corporation-licensee and the licensor entered into a licensing agreement regarding any inventions that the licensor might develop during the course of a development project. The licensor proceeded
to make an invention and subsequently applied for a patent. In the licensing agreement, the licensee promised not only to pay royalties, but also to
refrain from challenging the validity of any licensed patent which might be
issued to the licensor.
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Point, and not a promise to avoid a validity contest as in Lear.
There are two reasons why this is so, neither of which was explicitly recognized in the Supreme Court's Quick Point opinion.
First, the trade secret licensor has irrevocably parted with
so much of his secret as he has already disclosed at the time that
the licensee ceases paying royalties. Thus, the licensee continued to enjoy the benefit of the disclosed secrets, while refusing
to pay anything at all for such continuing benefit. If the licensor
attempts to remedy this situation by terminating the license and
seeking an injunction against the licensee's further use of the
licensed subject matter, and if this subject matter has already
been disclosed to the public as a result of the licensee'- authorized sale of the product, as in both Quick Point and Listerine,
then the licensor may be denied a permanent injunction for the
reasons set forth in Part 5 above. In contrast, a patent licensor
probably can terminate the license if the licensee breaches the
license agreement by ceasing to pay royalties. 48 Thus, the patent licensee ceases at that point to enjoy any further immunity
from suit for patent infringement, which is the benefit he was to
have received in exchange for the royalties he failed to pay.
Thereafter the licensee is an infringer, and may be enjoined
from further use.49 Thus, the patent licensor has a greater possibility of recapturing the licensed subject matter, and is much
less in need of contract enforcement than the trade secret licensor.
Second, as emphasized in Kewanee,50 a crucial difference
between patent and trade secret protection is that patents are
affected with a strong public interest in a way that trade secrets
are not: patent protection restrains the public generally, while
trade secret protection restrains only those who have assumed
some private relation with the plaintiff, be it a tortfeasor relation
or one of a consensual nature. Thus, the effect of enforcing trade
secret royalty liability, even if the royalties are so large that the
defendant must abandon the product rather than pay the roy48. There is some conflict in the cases in this area. See McCarthy, Unmuzzling the Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake of Lear v. Adkins, 59 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 475 511-19 (1977). But see Lee v. Lee Custom Eng'r, Inc., 476
F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1976).

50. The Supreme Court in Kewanee stated:
Trade secret law provides for weaker protection in many respects than
the patent law. While trade secret law does not forbid the discovery of
the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or
reverse engineering, patent law operates "against the world," forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a significant
length of time.
416 U.S. at 489-90, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 681.
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alty, is limited to a narrowly defined class of competitors;
whereas the effect of a holding of patent validity is to threaten
all the competitors in the nation. With that distinction in mind,
it should be recalled that the licensee in Lear was allowed to
dishonor his promise, not because of any compelling personal
equities, but simply because he, as the one with probably the
greatest economic incentive to contest patent validity, was most
likely to uphold the paramount public interest.5 1 Thus, a patent
licensee who disregards his contractual promise concerning validity contest is not personally deserving of judicial deference,
but nevertheless receives the unavoidable personal benefit
which goes along with his court-appointed role as vicarious defender of the public interest. Trade secret royalty liability, on
the other hand, is imposed only on the licensee, while the general public remains free to acquire the secret through any
means which do not violate our notions of tort law or of contractual or confidential relations. Therefore, there is no analogous
reason to release him from his commitments so that he will be
free to champion a public cause.
But the promise not to contest validity in Lear is not truly
comparable to a promise to pay royalties. A more relevant case
in this respect would be Brulotte,5 2 where the issue actually was
the permissible duration of royalty liability. Does Brulotte'spatent royalty cut-off, based on a federal pre-emption rationale,
suggest that trade secret royalties also are subject to some maximum permissible duration, despite state law to the contrary in
cases such as Listerine?
A strong argument can be made that the answer to this
question is no. Brulotte treated pre-emption as the price that
federal law could exact in return for the legislative privilege of
patent protection. That case merely confirmed the notion, inherent in the idea of a limited patent term, that after patent expiration the previously protected subject matter is required to be
51. The Supreme Court recognized in Lear that licensees are often the
only ones with the requisite economic incentives to challenge the validity of
a patent. If validity contests by licensees are impeded, the public may be
compelled to pay royalties to patent holders without justification. Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned that the requirements of state contract
law must give way to the public interest in testing the validity of patents.
52. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 143 U.S.P.Q. 264 (1964), reh. denied,
379 U.S. 985 (1965). In Brulotte, the owner of various patents issued licenses
for the use of the patented invention in connection with several machines.
All the patents expired prior to the time for termination of the royalty obligations set forth in the licensing agreements. The licensees refused to pay
royalties after the patents expired. The Supreme Court applied the federal
pre-emption doctrine, and held that federal patent policy rendered unenforceable any subsequent payment of royalties after patent expiration.
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freely available, i.e., without further royalty liability.5 3 As the

Supreme Court recognized in its Quick Point decision,5 4 there
appears to be no sound policy reason why a similar federal intrusion into the sanctity of state common law contract principles
is justified where the license does not depend upon the force of
the federal patent statute exerted against the public generally,
but only upon a private consensual relation entered into voluntarily by a particular licensee.
8.

Is QUICK POINT A TRADE SECRET CASE?

The Eighth Circuit's majority opinion 5 5 attempted to blur
this distinction between patents and trade secrets by taking the
position that Quick Point was not a trade secret case at all, in
part because after the license was entered into the secret became generally known. 56 In Quick Point such disclosure was
unavoidable, because once the licensed product reached the
market it inherently revealed the previously secret details of its
structure to any purchaser who cared to engage in reverse-engineering. But in Listerine, where perpetual royalty liability was
allowed, it was equally true that after the license was entered
into the secret eventually became generally known through re53. Id. at 31, 143 U.S.P.Q. at 265, relying on Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256, 67 U.S.P.Q. 193, 196 (1945).
54. 99 S.Ct. at 1099, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 5.
55. Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson, 567 F.2d 757, 196 U.S.P.Q. 281 (8th
Cir. 1977).
56. The majority explained this distinction as follows:
The dissent describes the contract as a "trade-secret licensing
agreement." We doubt that the keyholder could ever have been characterized as a trade secret. Although it may have been an "invention," it
was a relatively simple device and once marketed, it was completely
disclosed. See Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b. ("Matters which
are completely disclosed by the goods one markets cannot be secret.")
The dissent agrees that the parties "intended that Aronson would
in good faith attempt to patent the keyholder." The language from Milgrim's law review article quoted by the dissent further supports our

conclusion that patent principles apply in this case. Milgrim states:
* * * the license reward for a trade secret tends to be a function of

consideration for disclosure; for a patent, consideration for use * *
*. Since a prospective trade secret licensee knows that his licensor
cannot protect him from independent developers, he weighs the
value of disclosure against the risks of relying on matter which is
subject to third-party royalty-free use. Whether articulated or not,
such balancing is the stuff that leads to hard negotiating for royalty
rate and duration.

Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: 0/ Whales and Other Matters, 46
N.Y.U.L. REV. 17, 30 (1971). Quick Point contracted for "the exclusive

right to make and sell keyholders of the type shown in [Aronson's] application * *." The agreement was not for disclosure but for the exclusive right to manufacture an invention that was to be patented.
567 F.2d at 763 n.5, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 283 n.5.
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verse-engineering, although in Listerine it took much longer for
that to happen.5 7 Therefore, Quick Point cannot be distinguished from Listerine on the ground that it is any less a trade
secret case.
Indeed the factual differences between Quick Point and Listerine form the basis for an argument that the licensor's claim to
perpetual royalties was even stronger in Quick Point than in
Listerine. In Quick Point, "[ajlthough ingenious, the design
[for a keyholder] was so simple that it readily could be copied
unless it was protected by a patent."5 8 Thus, the licensee in
Quick Point had to know the product was immediately reverseengineerable, while in Listerine the mouthwash ingredients
were far less obvious and therefore, at the time the license was
entered into, the licensee probably could not have anticipated
that many years later, technology would make it possible to decipher the formula. Therefore, the licensee in Quick Point, unlike his counterpart in Listerine, could not attempt to justify his
cessation of royalty payments on the ground that a legitimate
expectation of perpetual secrecy, and hence, perpetual protection from competition, had been disappointed.
The dissent in the Court of Appeals in Quick Point quite
properly recognized that the case did involve trade secrets, in
the sense that the product was secret at the time the license
agreement was entered into.59 This made Quick Point a trade
secret case in precisely the same sense that Listerine was a
trade secret case; i.e., both cases squarely raised the issue of
whether an unqualified promise, made in order to induce the
disclosure of information which was secret prior to the time of
the disclosure, remains enforceable even after the information
becomes generally known.
The other reason why the Quick Point majority opinion in
57. In Listerine, the secret formula was developed in the 1880's and the

formula remained secret until 1931. 178 F. Supp. 655, 659, 666, 123 U.S.P.Q.
431, 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
58. 99 S. Ct. at 1097, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 3.

59. The dissenting judge stated:
The majority questions characterizing this agreement as a tradesecret licensing agreement, noting that the keyholder was a simple device and could be copied. The fact remains that the keyholder was secret at the time it was disclosed and it was not successfully copied until

the late 1960's, long after it had been marketed. It is precisely because
disclosure and marketing may lead to copying that parties will enter

into express contracts extending payment obligations beyond the duration of secrecy. The question is whether such agreements are enforceable as a matter of contract law, not whether, absent an express
agreement, trade secret law would afford protection once copying has
occurred.
567 F.2d at 763 n.4, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 285-286 n.4 (Larson, J., dissenting).
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the Court of Appeals insisted that Quick Point was not a trade
secret case was stated in the following terms: "Quick Point contracted for 'the exclusive right to make and sell keyholders of
the type shown'. . . . The agreement was not for disclosure but
the exclusive right to manufacture .... ,,60 That conclusion

could hardly have been completely correct, because the license
agreement required Quick Point to pay a royalty (at a lower
rate) even if no patent (i.e., no exclusive right to manufacture)
was obtained by the licensor. 61 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit
used this reasoning as a basis for treating Quick Point's license
in the same way Brulotte treated a patent license, though Quick
Point's licensor never obtained a patent on the licensed product.

62

This patent-like treatment was apparently justified by the
Court of Appeals on the ground that the licensor in Quick Point
had filed a patent application on the licensed product (which
was eventually abandoned after rejection by the Patent and
Trademark Office). Presumably, therefore, the Court of Appeals
majority would have distinguished the Listerine case on the
ground that Listerine was a trade secret license case, 63 while
Quick Point, although not really a patent license case, was for
some reason to be treated exactly as though a patent license
were involved, merely because of the presence of an abandoned
patent application. Until laid to rest by the Supreme Court, the
implications of this reasoning were disquieting. A court in a
trade secret/patent application license situation would have
been permitted to nullify provisions of the license agreement, in
the same way that provisions of the licenses were nullified in
both Lear and Brulotte, on federal pre-emption grounds, as a
price the licensor pays, not for using the patent system, but for
merely attempting to use the patent system.
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's view, there is no legitimate
parallel between Quick Point and the Lear-Brulotte line of
cases. Lear and Brulotte both involved issued patents. Even if
the licensed information had once been a trade secret in Lear, it
had since passed over into the realm of patented subject matter,
and so the force of the patent laws had protected the patentee
against the public generally. In return for such rigorous statu60. Id. at 760 n.5, 196 U.S.P.Q. at 283 n.5. For full text of n.5, see note 56
supra.
61. 99 S. Ct. at 1099, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 4. The provisions of the royalty
agreement in Quick Point are described in note 15 supra.
62. Id. at 1098, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 3.
63. The dissenting opinion in the court of appeals considered Quick
Point to be "virtually on all fours" with Listerine. 567 F.2d at 763, 196

U.S.P.Q. at 286 (Larson, J., dissenting).
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tory protection, the patentee owed allegiance to certain federal
policies which have been made conditions of the patent grant:
the risk of validity challenge in the case of Lear; and an end to
royalties in the case of Brulotte. But in Quick Point,the licensor
never enjoyed such general protection, and never received any
benefit from the patent statute, because she never received a
patent grant. Thus, it would seem that there was never any reason to apply to her those policies which were decisive in Lear
and Brulotte.
9.

TURNING THE PATENT LAws INTO A DISINCENTIVE

One possible rebuttal to this argument is that the licensor in
Quick Point ought to pay the price of admission to the patent
system (the same federal pre-emption price that was levied in
Lear and Brulotte) simply because she attempted unsuccessfully to obtain a patent. If this argument had been accepted, it
would have presented the owners of new technology with a substantial disincentive to file patent applications in a great many
instances. Unless an invention clearly merited patent protection of significant scope, a potential licensor would have been
properly reluctant to test the patentability of the invention by
filing a patent application. If the secret had been of the type
which is necessarily immediately disclosed upon marketing of
the product, as in Quick Point, the licensor would certainly have
lost his right to royalties if he later found it necessary to abandon his patent application and rely instead on trade secret protection. Even if the product was not immediately disclosed, but
nevertheless might someday be successfully analyzed, as in Listerine, then under the circumstances described there would
have been a significant risk that the right to royalties would
eventually be lost.
10.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KEWANEE

This disincentive to fie patent applications would have
64
been strongly inconsistent with the rationale of Kewanee.
There, the Supreme Court made it clear that trade secret protection was suspected of violating federal patent policy precisely
because it was alleged to have a discouraging effect on the filing
of patent applications. 65 The Court was able to discredit that allegation, and therefore decided that trade secret protection was
64. For a discussion of Kewanee, see note 3 supra.
65. The Court stated: "If a State, through a system of protection, were

to cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions would not
seek patents, we would be compelled to hold that such a system could not
constitutionally continue to exist." 416 U.S. at 489, 181 U.S.P.Q. at 681.
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not in conflict with patent law;66 but it did accept the premise
that if a substantial disincentive to enter the patent system
could be found, it would be inconsistent with the patent statute,
and should not be tolerated. By that same reasoning it can be
argued that any penalty which is attached to the mere filing of a
patent application harms the operation of the patent system and
runs counter to the objectives of the patent laws.
11.

THE ANTITRUST EXCEPTION

Another possible rebuttal to the argument that patent applications must not be treated the same as patents, for federal preemption purposes, was advanced by Justice Blackmun in the
concurring opinion in the Supreme Court in the Quick Point
case. Although his reasoning did not lead him to dissent from
the Court's holding, he did criticize the majority opinion in these
words:
Mrs. Aronson has used the leverage of her patent application to
negotiate a royalty contract which continues to be binding even
though the patent application was long ago denied.
[I]t may well be that Quick Point agreed to that contingency in
order to obtain its other rights that depended on the success of the
patent application. The parties did not apportion consideration in
the neat fashion the Court adopts [i.e., 5% for patent protection, 21/2% without patent protection] .67
Compare the reasoning of the majority opinion:
[Ilt is clear that the parties contracted with full awareness of
both the pendency of a patent application and the possibility that a
patent might not issue. The clause de-escalating the royalty by half
in the event no patent issued within five years makes that crystal
clear. Quick Point apparently placed a significant value on exploiting the basic novelty of the device, even if no patent issued ....
to the 2-1/2% royalty was explicitly in[T]he provision relating 68
dependent of federal law.
In the absence of proof to the contrary by the licensee, it
would seem that a court is entitled to assume that a royalty allocation freely agreed to by the parties represents their consensus
business judgment as to the respective values of a license
granted under one or more patents and/or patent applications,
on the one hand, and a simultaneously granted license of trade
secrets, on the other hand. If the licensee can prove, however,
that the licensor refused to grant a license desired by the licen66. "In the case of trade secret law, no reasonable risk of deterrence
from patent application by those who can reasonably expect to be granted
patents exist." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 489, 181 U.S.P.Q.
at 681.
67. 99 S. Ct. at 1111, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 6 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 1099, 201 U.S.P.Q. at 4.
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see, under a patent and/or patent application, unless the licensee also took an undesired trade secret license, with or without a
perpetual royalty liability clause, then the licensor might be
thought to have engaged in a form of mandatory package licensing, which appears to be a forbidden tie-in under Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.69 One effect of such a holding would
probably be to render the license, and with it any perpetual royalty clause, unenforceable on the ground that it violates public
policy. 70 (Note that this would be a reflection of the antitrust
policy against tie-ins, and not a result of any general patent policy concerning perpetual royalty liability in trade secret
licenses.) But in the absence of proof by the licensee of such an
illegal tie-in, it may justifiably be assumed that the license
under the patent and/or patent application and the license of
the trade secrets were packaged together merely for the convenin which event it seems there would be no
ience of the licensee,
71
illegal tie-in.
12.

THE TIME OF ELECTION

There is another reason why the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Quick Point was wrong, a reason having to do with the timing of
an inventor's final election as between patent and trade secret
protection. So long as a patentable invention is not generally
disclosed and has not been in public or commercial use more
than a year prior to patent filing, 72 it is eligible for both patent
and trade secret protection, and the inventor has the option of
choosing the form of protection which he prefers. Ultimately
the proprietor of the invention must make an irrevocable election between the two; because they are mutually exclusive. The
reasons for this mutual exclusivity are as follows: When issued,
a patent becomes a general publication of its contents. 73 The secrecy needed for trade secret protection would therefore require
that certain essential information be withheld from the patent
as published; but such withholding is not permitted by the disclosure requirements of the patent system. 74 Therefore, the in69. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
161 U.S.P.Q. 577 (1969); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 135 U.S.P.Q.
201 (1962); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 77
U.S.P.Q. 243 (1948).
70. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661,664-65,
60 U.S.P.Q. 21, 24 (1944).
71. See, e.g., Zenith

Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,

161 U.S.P.Q. 577 (1969); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research
Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 85 U.S.P.Q. 378 (1950).
72. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) (1976).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 11 (1976).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).

19791

A Quick Point

ventor must eventually choose either secrecy or patent
publication. This election has always been postponable until
the patent application is allowed by the Patent and Trademark
Office, and the proprietor of the invention finally authorizes that
Office to grant the patent by payment of the issue fee. 75 The
election did not have to be made at the time the patent application was filed; this was true because of the combined effect of
two facts: first, the fact that an application is held in confidence
by the Patent and Trademark Office throughout its entire period
of pendency,7 6 thus preserving secrecy until the moment of
grant; and second, the fact that the owner of the application is
entitled to abandon it (thus aborting the threatened publication
77
of the patent) at any time prior to such final authorization.
But the effect of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Quick Point
would have been to move the last date for this election up to the
filing date of the patent application, because that decision held
that merely filing an application in the Patent and Trademark
Office would have been enough to limit royalties to the period of
actual secrecy. Thus, merely knocking on the door of the Patent
and Trademark Office would have made it risky thereafter to
rely on trade secret protection for products of the Listerine type,
which might be reverse-engineerable, and downright foolhardy
to rely on trade secret protection for products of the Quick Point
type, which clearly are reverse-engineerable.
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Quick Point, for
several reasons, was inconsistent with sound prior law in the
field of trade secret licensing. Its reversal by the Supreme Court
was correct, in that it preserved the proper balance between
75. 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(2) (1976).
76, 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976). It has been expressly recognized that this section of the Patent Statute is designed in part for the purpose of protecting
the trade secret rights of a patent applicant until his patent issues. "Maintenance of confidentiality in the [Patent and Trademark Office] is * * *
premised on protection of trade secrets * * *."In re Mosher, 199 U.S.P.Q. 82,
84 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910, 201 U.S.P.Q. 256 (1979). But

that consideration does not in itself foreclose the royalty pre-emption issue

considered here, because the assumption underlying § 122 appears to be
that the invention would remain secret provided the Patent and Trademark
Office did not disclose it. In Quick Point, however, the secret had inherently been disclosed generally by the licensee's authorized sale of the licensed keyholder, while the patent application was still pending. The
quoted passage from the Mosher case goes on to establish a second purpose
for § 122: "to remove all impediments to early disclosure [by the filing of a
patent application] which would stem from an absence of confidentiality
[on the part of the Patent and Trademark Office]." This concern, that the
flng of patent applications not be discouraged by the fear of loss of trade
secret protection prior to patent issuance, is quite parallel to that which I
have expressed in Parts 9 and 10, above.
77. 35 U.S.C. § 133 (1976).
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state trade secret law and federal patent policy which was established in Kewanee.

